Behind the Skies: Daryl Guberman's Alarming Insights on Boeing Quality Control and Aviation Safety

NEW YORK - Dec. 31, 2024 - PRLog -- Renowned quality assurance 40 plus year expert Daryl Guberman has sounded the alarm on critical flaws in aviation safety, exposing unsettling practices within Boeing's quality control processes. Speaking at an April 2024 Senate subcommittee meeting QA EXPERT DARYL GUBERMAN STANDS UP AT DHS SUBCOMMITTEE April 17,2024 Washington DC https://youtube.com/shorts/1U8CSHorLEw , Guberman presented compelling evidence supporting Sam Salephour whistleblower claims that design flaws exist in Boeing's widely used 777 and 787 aircraft models. His testimony painted a concerning picture of a company prioritizing cost savings over stringent safety standards, jeopardizing the trust of passengers and aviation professionals alike. April 17 Capital Hill  DHS Subcommittee, listening to Sam Salephour - Daryl Guberman after last speaker from MIT gets up and interrupts meeting with additional information corroborating what whistleblower talks about  please note I was not invited to talk, but those two pieces of paper. Which exposed Boeing to 22 years of zero on site auditing you can't make this up.

https://www.newstribune.com/photos/2024/apr/18/3749044/

Central to Guberman's warning is Boeing's decision to relinquish on-site supplier audits, a cornerstone of quality assurance, to third-party certification organizations for 22 years as seen here  April 2002 https://www.boeingsuppliers.com/nadcap/nadcapletter.pdf

July2002 https://www.boeingsuppliers.com/supplier/BQMS_Bulletin-BQMS_CRB_and_Survey-July_2002.pdf . He revealed that instead of conducting direct inspections, Boeing now relies on these organizations to verify that parts meet required safety and performance standards. This shift, Guberman argued, significantly weakens oversight, and opens the door to potential fraud, as the certifications may lack the rigor and transparency of an in-person audit.

Guberman expanded on the flaws within the AS9100 certification system, which relies on a "flow-up and flow-down" process to ensure traceability and compliance across the supply chain. However, he highlighted that these measures often fail, leaving the origins of critical components unclear. "Can a piece of paper confirm whether a part was properly manufactured, heat-treated, and tested?" Guberman asked. "Or was it supplied to Boeing from the address listed on the certificate, only to have been outsourced to a cheaper facility, where all the company did was stamp their logo on the results?"

This lack of transparency raises significant safety concerns, as parts produced in countries like China or other low-cost facilities may not adhere to stringent aerospace standards. In many cases, parts can enter the supply chain through intermediaries, leaving manufacturers like Boeing unaware of their true origins. Without vigorous auditing and verification processes, there is no guarantee that components meet the necessary safety and performance criteria.

Adding to the concerns, Guberman highlighted troubling practices at the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) level. He pointed out that Boeing itself has been caught falsifying documentation on multiple occasions, including discrepancies in the quality of metals used in aircraft Boeing passenger jets have falsely-certified Kobe Steel products: https://finance.yahoo.com/news/boeing-passenger-jets-falsely-certified-kobe-steel-products-021244749--sector.htm Internal Investigation Reveals Boeing Employees Falsified Inspection Data  https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/latest-news/today-in-security/2024/may/boeing-employees-falsify-reports/

. Most recently, Boeing agreed to pay $8.1 million in penalties for failing to properly record autoclave information https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/boeing-pay-81-million-resolve-alleged-false-claims-act-violations-arising-manufacture , a critical process in manufacturing, as part of a government contract spanning from 2007 to 2018. Guberman questioned how suppliers, even if certified, can be trusted when such issues originate within the OEMs themselves.

"These failures are not isolated incidents," Guberman stated. "When the OEM—the entity ultimately responsible for the aircraft—is found fudging documentation and neglecting critical manufacturing processes, how can anyone expect suppliers to uphold rigorous standards? The system is broken at every level."

Guberman's concerns are underscored by recent aviation incidents, where maintenance issues were cited as contributing factors. While airlines or ground crews often shoulder the blame, Guberman points to flawed manufacturing and insufficient quality checks at the supplier level as possible root causes. He argues that the reliance on third-party certifications distances manufacturers from direct accountability, putting passengers at risk.

The aviation industry has long been a symbol of technological achievement, but Guberman warns that such reputations can obscure systemic weaknesses. By forgoing direct oversight of suppliers, Boeing and other manufacturers may unwittingly allow subpar practices to infiltrate their supply chains. This, he cautions, could lead to devastating consequences if unchecked.

Guberman's testimony serves as a call to action for regulators, manufacturers, and the public. He urges passengers to demand higher safety standards and greater transparency from aviation companies. Regulators, he contends, must revisit and strengthen oversight practices to ensure manufacturers take full responsibility for their supply chains.

As Guberman concluded, "Safety in the skies begins on the ground—with the parts, processes, and people ensuring that every component is built to last and perform under the most demanding conditions." His insights are a stark reminder that vigilance and accountability must remain at the heart of the aviation industry to uphold its promise of safety and reliability.